Security is What People Make of It:
The African Great Lakes and the Security Debate

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Introduction

What is Security? This study is essentially concerned with attempting to identify and explain security with regard to the Great Lakes region. It will do so by tapping into the debate about security that has been fiercely fought for over a decade. This is an especially worthwhile endeavour since the concept is closely related to questions of war and peace as well as our other most precious values. Furthermore it remains influential in policy debates while it is also seen by many such as Buzan to be a more sophisticated approach to study international relations compared with concepts of power and peace. For a study on the concept of security then the Great Lakes region forces itself under the analytical microscope regardless of the views on what constitutes security. Not only have theories of IR in general and of strategic studies in particular been rarely applied to Africa - the region has also experienced and been home to economic decline and exploitation, political exclusion, forced and changing identity patterns, environmental degradation, genocides and now the biggest interstate war in Africa's history. Thus one has to sadly recognize that the Great Lakes are one of

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the most insecure regions whatever the definition of security or its referent object. In order to find the right conceptual tool to identify and explain insecurity in the Great Lakes this study will apply the main approaches to security in the literature. This will serve two ends. One the one hand this method will be able to highlight security and its nature in the Great Lakes while on the other hand the nature of security in the Great Lakes will highlight the deficiencies and limitations of the different models. Hence it will be argued that the orthodox approach to security not only fails by its own standards but apart from that is unable to capture the insecurity dilemmas of people and states in the Great Lakes. Maintaining the orthodoxy's assumption that security of other units must always be a derivative of individual security the study will demonstrate that the Third World Critique is very successful in shedding light on the insecurity dilemma faced by regimes in the Great Lakes while stressing its failure to incorporate other social collectivities that play major protective roles. Similarly, it will be argued that the Broadening Critique contributes to our understanding by exposing the immense economic threats regimes face, though its state- and ethno centrism prevents it from moving beyond this realization. Since a combination of the two approaches will be rendered insufficient the study will propose a possible way forward in the debate by demonstrating the superiority of a social constructivist approach in explaining security in the Great Lakes. Whether this concept, however, will require two conceptions or is able to integrate different securitizations without conceptual difficulties will be discussed in the last section of the study. With regard of the structure of the study the above mentioned parts will be introduced by a short history of the concept of security as well as the analytical foundation of the orthodox view. Both of these are essentially in laying the basis for the arguments to come but are kept short. Considering sources for this study it has been attempted to use a variety of sources ranging from materials about the debate and the different approaches as well as more general works about the African state system in addition to literature specific to the Great Lakes.

The foundations of the orthodox approach to security

A short evolutionary history of the meaning and usage of 'security'

Now this essay will briefly sketch the normative foundation of the orthodox approach to security. This will be done by, first, identifying and explaining the underlying assumptions of the approach, secondly, by putting forth the reasons of scholars for the choice of these assumptions and put them in a broader historical context to enhance

one's understanding about the evolution of the discipline and the importance and juncture the current debate represents for the same. Finally, some consequences of this choice for the discipline as well as the 'world out there' will be mentioned.

The orthodox approach rests on three central assumptions namely that the referent object of security is the Westphalian type of state, that security threats to this state come from other states (i.e. are external) and that the only valid security threats are military threats. It is often claimed that this view of the security reaches back to the Treaty of Westphalia which laid the basis for the modern European state based on the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty. However, as Rothchild convincingly argues, individual accounts of security had been the most common and important until the Napoleonic Wars.[2] Especially the relationship between the individual and the state was of prime concern and was also central to liberal political thinking. But it was well before the Enlightenment, namely at the time of the Treaty of Westphalia, that one of the most prominent proponents of individual security, Thomas Hobbes, stipulated a model aimed at how to secure individuals from the destructive consequences of insecurity. According to Hobbes, when "men live without other security, than what their own strength…[i]n such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of Earth…no Knowledge…no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of a man, solitary, poore, nasty brutish, and short."[3] Hence , although Hobbes is also concerned about physical security (i.e. security from force) which he views as a prerequisite for the attainment of other goods[4], his referent object is the individual and not the state. Indeed, it is"[p]ersonal insecurity [that] turns out to be the motivation for state building."[5] However, this individual account of security was increasingly marginalized by a view of security which had as its referent object the sovereign state. This was the result, it is argued, of a greater and more intense interrelation of states and later 'nation-states' as well as an endorsement of Hobbes's view of states as the "guarantors of…order, liberty, justice, welfare"[6] and protectors of individual security from internal and external threats.[7] Although the 'state-as-protector' assumption then was in many ways at least as questionable than it is now, concepts of individual security increasingly gave way to concepts of national state security. The elimination of notions of individual security has, until recently, transformed the centrality of the state to

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[2] Rothchild, p.60-65
[3] Hobbes, p.89 (Ch.13, [62])
[4] Basically, one could argue that Hobbes proposes a hierarchy of securities topped by physical security.
[5] Jackson (1992), p.82
[6] Jackson (1992), p.81
[7] Pettiford, p.8

questions of security into a law-like aspect of International Relations which was rarely challenged.[8] As a theorist notes: "while there has been much debate about the compatible or incompatible nature of state security with the security of the international system…the security of units below the level of the state has rarely, if ever, been an important point of issue".[9] This is true for both Realism and Idealism despite the association of the orthodox view with (Neo-)Realism. Both disciplines were concerned with "war avoidance" between states and differed largely only in the assessment of the prospects for peace and the ways of achieving it. This view of security was fermented while further limited to mainly nuclear issues in the 'Golden Age' of security studies which was founded after the World War II as a sub-field of International Relations. Here, even non-military issues which were later seen as very relevant as, for example, diplomacy and causes of state behaviour, were excluded in favour of war outcome scenarios in nuclear times.[10]

However it was with the dominance of Realism and later Neorealism in security/strategic studies which was founded as a sub-field of International Relations after World War II which further fermented theses assumptions about the legitimate referent (state), threat (military) and source of threats (other states) with regard to security. Neorealism became so dominant in security studies that the belief and support for the underlying assumptions was almost religious. Although there were considerably divergent views within this framework hardly anyone questioned the nature of the subject matter or as two critics noted "[t]o be a member of the security studies community has traditionally meant that one already *knows* what is to be studied."[11] Although there has never been one uncontested definition of security even in those times many scholars broadly agreed with the following definitions: "A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war."[12]. Consequently, security studies is "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force"[13] Other views on security had a very tough stand against this 'consensus' for two reasons. Academically, Neorealism is based on a 'scientific' i.e. positivist epistemology which demanded from other theories to meet its standards of regarding quantification of variables, hypothesis testing and so forth. Thus it was able to ignore less quantifiable issues and social phenomena. In addition, Neorealism stipulated the distinctiveness of the international realm (of states) which it grounded in

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[8] Krause (1997), p. 39
[9] Pettiford, p.8
[10] Walt, p.213-215
[11] Krause, Williams (1997), p.ix
[12] Lippmann quoted in Baylis, p.195
[13] Walt, p.212

the structural characteristics of anarchy and was therefore able to exclude any rival referent objects. Practically, security studies was never a market place of a variety of views but a 'purpose-built' policy-focused discipline endowed with the task of exploring the revolutionary impact of nuclear power and the Cold War in general to US 'national security' and supplying the US government with policy proposals.[14] Hence it is hardly surprising that the reasons for the fierce defense of these assumptions were heavily influenced by the ideology and power considerations of US Cold War politics. Given this powerful backing other approaches to security such as Peace Studies were either marginalized or rather successfully ignored and thus Neorealist security studies was able to 'win' the right to define security which "provides…the *authority* to articulate new definitions and discourses of security".[15] It is exactly this authority over determining the assumptions, i.e the framework of the discipline that Neorealist security studies has been increasingly losing over the last ten years of debate and that could mark its academic demise.

The analytical foundation of the orthodox approach

Having outlined and elaborated on the history of the normative foundation of the orthodox view of security it will now be necessary to briefly and somewhat simplistically sketch the analytical foundation i.e. its operationalisation. As has been shown above the orthodox approach rests on the Neorealist paradigm. It stipulates, a priori, that the legitimate object referent to be secured is the state and to secure the state means to secure its (physical) survival.[16] Since Neorealists see the state both as the central unit of international relations the international system becomes anarchic. Moreover since they further see the state as the locus of security the anarchic system becomes the main source of insecurity through the structural logic it imposes on states. The reason for rendering anarchy problematic is not only the lack of an enforcing authority but given this situation it is the unavoidable and insurmountable uncertainty and lack of trust that constitute the logic of the self-help system.[17] Hence self-help denotes a situation in which states cannot trust each other or expect help from other states and therefore have to rely on their own power for state security. Analogous to the view of survival in physical terms Neorealists see power in terms of

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[14] see Pettiford, p.5-8;
[15] Lipschutz, p.8
[16] As will be mentioned below this view obviously assumes that 'the state' is always clearly identifiable and always embodies the same core characteristics.
[17] Here it should be noted that the link between anarchy and an insecure self-help system has been famously and powerfully criticised by Wendt. See Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics' in *International Organization Vol.46, No. 2 (1992)*

military capabilities and hence each state will seek to increase its arsenal and quality of arms,i.e its military capabilities in order to increase its relative security. Hence security is a derivative of power. However, this is not the end of the story since even if all states' intentions were benign they would "fall victim to the security dilemma"[18] in which each state's accumulation of military capabilities for defense purposes is conceived as potentially threatening and thus sparks arms increases by other states resulting in escalations of arms races.[19] With regard to functional issues Neorealist security studies is concerned with assessing threats on the basis of military capabilities as well as other ways to enhance power e.g. alliances.

An attack on the orthodoxy: the inadequacy of the orthodox approach for insecurity in the Great Lakes

Having set out the foundations of the orthodox approach to security this study will now go a step further. In this section it will be shown that the orthodox approach to security employs a too narrow focus and inappropriate variables as to make sense of state insecurity as well as of insecurity of individuals (which as we have seen are the basic unit of 'social security') in the Great Lakes. This will be done in two parts: first, it will be argued that taking the state as referent is untenable by showing that the state-as-protector assumption does not hold in the Great Lakes. Hence since the state will be shown not to protect the individuals within (and often even constitutes the source of their insecurity) there will be no reason to 'care' about this entity and its security by orthodox standards.[20] Secondly, this study will show that even if one disregards this line of argument and for whatever reason insists on attempting to explain the insecurity of *states* in the Great Lakes the inapplicability of national security theory will render such an endeavour impossible and the orthodox approach thus inadequate. This, it will be argued, is due to inexistence of a national security which in the case of the Great Lakes is disguised by regime security.

The state as protector of individual security?

To assume that the Zairian or Rwandan state protected its citizens domestically from each other and from the state in order to provide them with the possibility of leading

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[18] Collins, p.13

[19] Collins, p.10-27; Baylis, p. 194-197; Dunne, p.114-119; Buzan, p.1-3, Wilkin, p.24,25;

[20] Of course, one could justify state security on other grounds, e.g. its importance for the security of the states system. However, the orthodox view gives importance to state security because the state is supposed to protect the good life of its citizens.

the good life is not only wrong but perverse. In both cases the state or regime did not only fail to protect large section of the population from violent attacks and killings by others and threats to their general well-being but in many instances instigated as well as planned and took active part in these events.

Here now the study will take a closer look at the Zairian situation in order to support argument. In Zaire, Mobutu[21] was the source of insecurity for the large majority of the population in many ways. Rather than enabling them to lead the 'good life' he transformed Zaire into an 'extractive state'[22] based on the exploitation of the country's people and resources. In order to ensure his grip on power and wealth he employed a 'divide and rule' system of 'dialectic oppression' which on the one hand fostered and perpetuated corruptive and exploitative practices on all levels of society by using the interplay of insecurity and scarcity while on the other hand eliminating and repressing resisting sections of society by the instigation and fuelling of ethnic conflict and state oppression tactics.

Economically, Mobutu exploited Zairians in several ways. Through his immense extraction of funds from Zaire's profitable mineral industry he ripped others off the possibility to share in these profits. After nationalization in the 70s he distributed many of the companies to 'friends' and other politicians as part of his patrimonial strategy and excluded competitors through monopolization and other political tactics. Moreover, by using a sophisticated method Mobutu was also able to use his power over state institutions to divert loans from the international financial institutions, private banks and most importantly bilateral donors (especially the US) into his personal account and of his supporters. This money, much of which was officially supposed to be used for developmental purposes and benefit the poor majority of Zairians was thus used to enrich Mobutu's family and friends, clients, and supportive Western politicians and industrialists.[23] Another important result of this extraction policies was that it created, through its detrimental effect on economic stability and health[24], very high costs for economic activity and thus great economic insecurity for any businesses and people not aligned to Mobutu's empire. One example are shopkeepers whose "business activity…[was] severely impeded by the absence of a stable currency, [and] the

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[21] Here the study will focus on Mobutu's and not the regime's security since exchange members of the regime so often that it can barely be called a regime.
[22] see Clark, John F (1998)
[23] It should be noted, however, that most bilateral aid was never meant to benefit the poor but benefit Mobutu's rule. That also explains why many creditors such as the US and due to its pressure the IMF and World Bank kept funding or supporting his regime despite their knowledge about the money's 'final destination'. This is illustrated by a report by Blumenthal, an IMF investigator who as early as 1982 stated: "'Any attempt to establish a more strict control of the budget is bound to fail because of one major obstacle: the Presidency…In this office, no distinction is made between state expenditures and personal needs'." Quoted in Ndikumana, p.208
[24] For example, inflation between 1990 and 1994 rose from 81 percent to 20,000 percent. See Clark, p.122

physical insecurity of their property".[25] But the Zairian state embodied by Mobutu did not only 'take away' it also failed to 'deliver' well-being and physical security to its people. Not only did basic social services drastically deteriorate in the 80s and 90s but the system of dialectic oppression ensured that even the most basic state services were targets of rent-seeking bureaucrats (who were themselves often un- or underpaid) so that ordinary people had to 'buy' any kind of government services.[26] Another important contributor to the people's insecurity was the army which, as part of Mobutu's divide and rule strategy, abused just as any other group or individual its position in order to survive or make profit. Since Mobutu usually held it unpaid so that it would have low morale and discipline and would hence be unable to challenge his well-equipped presidential guard the soldiers sought to exploit the population through the use of force. As de Waal explains: "In the vast and dispersed regions of Zaire, military commanders run what are in effect semi-autonomous fiefdoms. Many of their troops are not paid. Instead they engage in private commerce, raise contributions at roadblocks, or loot and pillage from the local population, and rape women and girls." [27] But this was not even the greatest insecurity people would have to fear. Apart from the repression and intimidation of enemies of the regime, Mobutu repeatedly instigated and fuelled ethnic conflicts to use them to his political advantage especially in the Shaba and Kivu regions.[28] Rather than attempting to mediate and communicate between groups such as the Banyarwanda[29] and the authochtones[30] that at times were in conflict over land and property issues in the Kivu region Mobutu supported the Banyarwanda when challenged by the authochtones but switched sides at times of the national conference in order to ensure their support.[31] He further fuelled this conflict by the revocation of the citizenship of all Congolese of Rwandan origin which stripped them of the right to own land and by the abolition of a 'principle of non-assignment' which prohibited to station soldiers in their home region and which resulted in harassment of the one group by soldiers of the other group.[32] Moreover, Mobutu also increased the insecurity of the Tutsi in the east of Zaire and helped trigger the first Congo war when he supplied arms to Hutu genocidaires which had brought much of the refugee camps in Eastern Zaire under control and used the weapons to attack Congolese Tutsis' villages and Rwandan villages across the border. All these instances clearly show that Mobutu was purely interested in his political survival and thus "did

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[25] Clark, p.119
[26] Clark, p.119
[27] De Waal, p.291
[28] Nzongola-Ntalaja, p.5; Lemarchand, p.198; McNulty, p.68; Gnamo, p.326,327
[29] The Banyarwanda are kinyarwanda speakers and trace their origin to Hutu and Tutsi from today's Rwanda.
[30] The Congolese in Eastern Congo that trace their origins to today's Congo such as the Nande, Hunde etc.
[31] Gnamo, p.326
[32] Gnamo, p.326,327

not adopt a responsible position...Instead of being an arbiter, he incited ethnic violence."[33] Summing up, it has been convincingly shown that Mobutu was more than anyone else the prime source of insecurity for large sections of the population whether in economic or physical terms. He used his state power to economically marginalize the vast majority of people except for a tiny political and economic elite and was further directly or indirectly responsible for large amounts of killings, tortures and rapes as part of his repression and ethnic conflict tactics. In other words, "the state's only apparent function was the systematic exploitation of its people and resources, while it offered nothing in return, not even security; instead, the state itself and its agents were the principal sources of insecurity."[34] Hence it has been shown that the Zairian state is not the protector of individual security and thus, according to the orthodox view, loses its 'right' to be the only legitimate referent object of security.

The failure of national security: regimes and insurgents

So far it has been shown that the orthodox approach's view that national security is a good because it protects individual security and domestic goods is not applicable to the Great Lakes Region. The same can be said for many Third World states in general. It is product of particular historical developments in Europe which have not necessarily occurred in this way in most Third World countries. It has been further shown that the state itself is often the principle source of insecurity. Consequently, the state-as-protector assumption and with it the claim that the state is the only legitimate referent has been rejected. However, this is no reason to rule out the validity of the orthodox approach for security in the Great Lakes since it has only been shown that the orthodox view is invalid by its own standards but not that it cannot be useful to explain *some* aspects of *state* insecurity in the Great Lakes. In other words, even if a state oppresses its own people (like apartheid-South Africa) it might still be possible to talk about the state's national security in realist terms although this focus might not be justifiable on moral grounds.[35] Thus in this section this study will enquire whether realist national security theory can retain some value by explaining the insecurity of states in the Great Lakes. However, it will be argued that the African state system renders the realist logic of national security dysfunctional and so that there are rarely states that other states would have to secure themselves from. Moreover, it will be

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[33] Gnamo, p.326

[34] McNulty, p.61

[35] Although one could argue that in a system of states a state's security is important for the security of all states and the preservation of the system. The prevention of a chaotic restructuring would benefit the people and therefore national security would be a value.

shown that a state as demanded by the theory does not exist and hence cannot be secured. Rather it is regimes that exist and attempt to secure themselves by using the institutions and other advantages of the state. The concept of national security is of little value in the Great Lakes because the African states system in general does not easily work according to realist logic. One characteristic of the African state system is very striking. Although the continent is home to some 53 countries [36] interstate war has been an absolute rarity.[37] Realist logic, of course, does not stipulate a high occurrence of wars but rather that states will try to increase their military capabilities so as to defend themselves against other states. However, most African states which over years heavily increased the size of their army or fighting forces did so in reaction to internal challenges in form of insurgents. Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan are some illustrative examples. This is not to say that African states did not have conflictual positions. Rather this conflict took different forms. Instead of fighting another country openly African governments were much more inclined to support insurgents in the adversary's state. This is mainly due to three reasons, namely the strength of sovereignty norms, the organizational and military weakness of states, and the protection of states by superpower patrons. African states usually respected norms of sovereignty one the one hand because they knew about the illegitimacy of most borders and thus feared a domino effect and on the other hand because it was very clear that legal sovereignty was a gift rather than a drawback for African leaders enabling them to claim legitimacy over an area much larger than they could physically control.[38] Moreover, often unable to control their own territory states probably saw no great prudence in trying to project it over the borders. Finally, during the Cold War this option seemed even more unattractive given that many states (and most notably Zaire) had enjoyed the backing of a major power and above all it was in both superpower's interest to maintain the border of states. As a result most conflict in Africa took the form of insurgency and conflictual foreign policy was expressed in supporting one adversary's insurgents. This phenomena cannot, as we have seen, be captured by realism whose focus on states and its military capabilities, security dilemmas and balances of power would grossly miss the crucial aspects of African international politics. However, not only does the orthodox view fail to explain the insecurities states face in the Great Lakes and in Africa in general but it also fails to distinguish between regime security and state security. While this is not a problem per se it will be shown that such a view, again, is unable to make sense of the complexity of insecurity in the Great Lakes. Zaire, again, is a prime example. Instead of obeying

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[36] New African Yearbook 1997-98
[37] Holsti, p.212-215

realist logic by increasing his state's military power and by deterrence measures, Mobutu, as has been shown above, weakened the state economically and militarily. As one analyst notes: "Mobutu started by running down the army, so that all but selected elite units were poorly equipped. By the 1990s, the army was merely 20,000 strong and one unit, the so-called Chinese tank brigade, did not have a single operational tank."[39] Creating and demobilising different armed forces, security services Mobutu could be confident that no single armed force could challenge him and thus ensured his own security. Hence Zaire's state was not driven by national security but by regime security considerations, or more precisely Mobutu's survival strategy.[40] Rwanda, also clearly illustrates that it is regime not national security which guides state behaviour in the Great Lakes. A telling case are the RPF invasions which started in 1990 from Uganda into Rwanda. A possible realist state response would entail declaring war on Uganda or mass mobilization and arms in order to prepare for war. However, by 1994 the government had carried out a well-planned genocide on Tutsi and the Hutu opposition that, however, got so out of hand that the RPF could successfully invade and conquer Rwanda. The explanation for these events lies in the security strategy of the regime not of the state. Under pressure to democratise from outside and inside, facing invasions of the RPF in the North as well as general discontent, the Northern extremist Hutu elite thought to maintain its grip on power by using and fuelling anti-Tutsi sentiments to scapegoat the Tutsi and by planning a genocide that would eliminate its Tutsi and moderate Hutu enemies. Thus in order to ensure their survival the extremist elite used state power to create "chaos from above"[41] which in the end weakened the state so much that it fell prey to the RPF. Summing up, as has become clear from the above analysis, the concept of national security is very unhelpful in the case of the Great Lakes since no realist state and thus no realist national security can be identified. Rather state behaviour is shaped by the security considerations of regimes which in many cases are dialectically opposed to state security. Since it has also been shown that realist logic cannot properly account for state behaviour the orthodox approach to security has to be rejected as inadequate and of little use for explaining insecurity in the Great Lakes.

Alternative approaches to security

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[38] see Herbst, Jeffrey (2000)
[39] De Waal, p.291
[40] That after 30 years of 'fragmentation as policy' his survival could for once actually depend on his state's military power did not, it seems, occur to him and this mistake in the end led to his fall.
[41] Longman, p.75

Although of little use in the end by applying the orthodox approach it has been revealed that there is no state but only regime security and that regimes in the Great Lakes are generally rather secure from outside military threats.[42] Having rejected the orthodox view it will now be necessary not only to examine the nature of insecurity in the Great Lakes but above all to 'find' and justify an appropriate referent object as well as legitimate threats and sources of threats. This will be done in the following way. Before one can intelligently talk about threats the object to be secured will have to be established. Hence it will first be necessary to find a referent which analogous to the orthodox approach will be chosen according to whether it protects the security of individuals or to be more precise to what extent individuals seek it for this kind of protection.[43] Once we have found[44] a referent we can then see what kind of threats from what kind of sources are perceived as such. Continuing with the same approach as above we will try to find the answers to these questions by applying alternative views of security to the Great Lakes. There have been a considerable amount of attacks on the orthodox view in the last years. Sadly, they have tended to emerge out of two distinct backgrounds and have continued, with some notable exceptions, to ignore each other's presence and arguments and have thus prevented a surely fruitful dialogue. This, as will be argued later in the study, is the result of the highly ideological nature of the debate and the concept of security itself. By first applying the so-called Third World Critique followed by the Broadening Critique it is hoped to shed light on the complexity of insecurity in the Great Lakes before it will be sought, in the final part of the study, to attempt to analyse this complexity within a new framework.

Looking inwards: The Third World Critique

The so-called Third World Critique refers to several authors that have tried to examine security from a Third World perspective. Far from being a homogeneous group it constitutes rather diverse views and there are even some authors that look at Third World insecurity but stay within the orthodox paradigm emphasising external military threats to the state although their number is negligibly small[45].Most, despite their differing accounts highlight the importance of domestic insecurity in Third World

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[42] The current interstate war being the obvious exception.

[43] This criterion, however, is in contrast to Hobbes's view on security not exclusively based on a view of the individual as an atom, a self-sufficient individual that seeks to form an aggregate, an instrumental contract. Rather this case is also compatible with 'communitarian' accounts since the referent might not only be an aggregate but also a community which protects not only its members but also the sociality of the group.

[44] Here it is very important to remember that it is not attempted to stipulate a referent as do other approaches. Rather the aim is to find out what referents people seem to select since as we will show later people securitize what they want.

[45] See, for example, Kolodziej, Edward (1982)

states.[46] One of the main protagonist of the so-called Third World Critique is Mohammed Ayoob whose approach will be examined more closely below. He attacks the orthodox view mainly on one ground. Ayoob attacks the orthodoxy's exclusive focus on external threats by stressing the crucial prominence of internal political and military challenges to Third World states or regimes: "it is surprising that many leading advocates of the view that the realist …paradigm has the greatest power, of all paradigms, to explain the international realities of the post-Cold War era virtually ignore the security situation in the Third World, where most members of the international system are located and where most of the conflicts are concentrated."[47] These "states' major security occupations are primarily internal in character and are a function of the early stages of state making at which they find themselves."[48] The two factors explaining Third World states' 'security predicament' are the above mentioned early stage of state making and the late entry into the international states system. Due to these two factors Third World states face, on the one hand great domestic insecurity because of competing claims of authority and on the other hand severe constraints from the international system to solve these problems in form of fixed and frozen borders, powerful saturated states and international norms regimes (e.g. the Human Rights regime). Hence Third World states are insecure because usually lack security soft- and hardware. Hardware refers to physical i.e. military and economic capabilities whereas software denotes the legitimacy of the state as well as the degree of integration and policy capacity.[49] Ayoob argues that since some Third World states possess considerable hardware it is especially their lack of security software that renders them insecure. They are 'split societies' often characterised by lack of internal cohesion (social, economic, ethnic and religious), lack of legitimacy for borders, the state and the regime and thus home to "competing locations of authority…[which] are usually weaker than the state in terms of coercive capacity but equal to or stronger than the state in terms of political legitimacy in the view of large segments of the states' populations."[50]. Hence a state like Denmark is more secure than India despite the greater military capabilities of the latter.[51] Ayoob's focus on states' internal insecurity and competing claims to state authority is very helpful in illustrating regime insecurity in the Great Lakes. As for Zaire, all regimes since independence were threatened by internal groups. Lumumba's authority was challenged not only by his

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[46] Third World security analysts include among others: Acharya, Amitav (1997), Alagappa, Muthiah (1987), Ayoob, Mohammed (1995)/(1997), Azar, Edward (1988), Buzan (1992), Job, Brian (1992), Krause, Keith (1996), Pettiford, Lloyd (1999), Thomas, Caroline (1999), Weiss, Thomas (1991)
[47] Ayoob (1997), p.123
[48] Ayoob (1997), p.121
[49] Azar, p. 77, 78
[50] Ayoob (1995), p.4
[51] Ayoob (1997), p.130; Ayoob (1995), p.11, 15, 21

external enemies but also by the Katanga secession under Tshombe[52]. Mobutu, after bringing an end to the Congo rebellions had to get outside support to win the two Shaba wars (against the FLNC in 1977 and 1978) before he was defeated by a rebel/state alliance (ADFL and Rwanda and Uganda in 1996) and Kabila and now his son as his successor have been facing three different rebel groups[53] together occupying about half of the country. Apart from these military challenges there have been consistently political challenges such as >from well-known Mobutu adversary Tshisekedi. Similarly, regimes in Rwanda and Burundi have been extremely insecure due to the high degree of politicisation of ethnic conflict that has penetrated both countries. Since the Hutu revolution of 1959 in Rwanda the two countries have experienced five military takeovers (Rwanda 1973; Burundi 1965, 1976, 1987, 1996), two overthrows of monarchies (Rwanda 1962; Burundi 1966), two genocides (Rwanda 1994; Burundi 1972) and civil wars (Rwanda 1990; Burundi still on-going) and many small raids and invasions from neighbouring countries.[54] These examples clearly corroborate Ayoob's argument about the absolute prominence of internal insecurity that many Third World states face. In that respect Ayoob's contributes considerably to understanding the insecurities Third World regimes have to deal with. As we have seen they are threatened by military and political challenges from other powerful groups in society. However, despite his powerful account Ayoob's subaltern realism suffers from his insistence on state-centrism with regard to both referent object and types of threats. Taking the state as referent object creates problems to understanding insecurity in the Great Lakes. Hence, Ayoob, by using state building as his explanatory theory and equating the regime with the state, excludes other social collectivities from becoming referents and thus fails to see the multidimensional dimension of domestic insecurity as well as fails to acknowledge economic and other threats that these social collectivities face. In order to show this we need to have a closer look at Ayoob's concept of state building. Ayoob start from the premises, already known to us, that a state has to protect society since as he quotes Ben-Dor, "[i]n the lack of political order, social and individual values are meaningless; they cannot be realized, nor can they be protected from assault, violence and chaos."[55] Hence, it is the "primary goal…[of Third World states to construct] credible and legitimate political apparatuses with the capacity to provide order…within the territories under their juridical control."[56] This process that entails the expansion, consolidation and maintenance of political control

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[52] Which admittedly was heavily influenced by these external powers especially Belgium.
[53] These are the MLC led by Bemba and supported by Uganda, the RCD Goma led by Ilunga and supported by Rwanda and the RCD Kisangani led by Wamba dia Wamba supported by Uganda.
[54] Lemarchand, p.197
[55] Ben-Dor quoted in Ayoob (1997), p.132
[56] Ayoob (1997), p.131

and authority over population and territory as well as the extraction of resources from the same.[57] This process of state building in the Third World is analogous to the European experience. The only but important difference is that the international environment pressures Third World states to complete this usually and inevitably very violent process in a extremely short period of time as well as in a humane manner without violating the norms (such as legal sovereignty) of the system.[58] Eventually, however, successful state building will solve Third World states' internal insecurity as well as secure them from powerful external interest. Based on this analysis Ayoob take the regime or state as referent to be secured from external but above all internal threats "that have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes."[59]

Now it will be shown that there are strong reasons to loosen the restrictions to legitimate object referents in order to include different kinds of social collectivities in addition to the state. Moreover, it will be shown that Ayoob's model of state building , though a very powerful explanatory tool, is not necessarily as linear and one-dimensional as suggested and can thus in some cases, as possibly in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) fail to materialise i.e. the state will not necessarily and eventually complete state building, thus fail secure society internally and externally. This case would further undermine Ayoob's state centrism with regard to security. Ayoob's emphasis on state and thus in his eyes on regime security is unjustified because of the lack of qualitative or quantitative superiority of the regime as compared to other social collectivities. Regimes in many African countries have often been very short-lived although this does not, except for Burundi, apply particularly well to the Great Lakes region. Given that they are usually concerned with their immediate survival which may not always, as will be shown below, include state building but rather engage in cost minimizing economic exploitation. One scholar described this situation as follows: "State building is a long-term phenomenon. Any single regime is likely to effect little overall impact on the state-building process unless it embarks on a path of social revolution and /or extraordinary coercion and repression. States (more appropriately, regimes) are preoccupied with the short term; their security and their physical survival are dependent on the strategies they pursue for the moment."[60] Moreover, regimes should not be seen as the exclusive referents because there are not necessarily the strongest force among all social collectivities and thus cannot demand

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[57] Ayoob (1997), p.132, 133
[58] Ayoob (1997), p.139,140
[59] Ayoob (1995), p.9; It is important to mention that Ayoob at other places talks about threats being legitimate if they have political outcomes or affect the political realm (1997, p.125). This would seem to imply a broader definition of threats. However, Ayoob also employs a rather restricted definition of the political realm that exclusively associates the political with the state.

superior status as main state builder. Rather whether one group will be associated with the state or not often depends on their power or luck to 'capture the capital' and with it international legitimacy. A telling example is the current situation in the DRC where the regime of Joseph Kabila is the internationally recognized representative of the DRC although it does barely control half of the country and does so only with immense help from Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and many militias and paramilitaries such as the Interahamwe and ex-FAR. At one point just after the start of the second war Laurent Kabila's regime was tremendously close to being defeated if it had not been for quick Angolan intervention that ward off the attack. This clearly shows that regimes cannot justifiably be taken as the only referent objects given their insufficient superiority compared to other groups. Besides, partly as a result of the relative mediocre strength of regimes (weak states) many other social collectivities are being sought by people in search for security. As Job argues:"[t]he insecurity dilemmas of Third World states are basically unresolvable as long as the various factions within society are able to compete effectively as security providers."[61] While Ayoob would most probably agree with this statement the point here is exactly because other groups are security providers of equal value it is unjustifiable to dismiss them due to 'wishful thinking' that *eventually* it is precisely the *current* regime which will in the end complete the state building process and will thus have to be secured. This argument is supported by many events in the Great Lakes. For example, when in the aftermath of the genocide Hutu genocidaires in collaboration with sections of the FAZ (Zaire's army) started attacking (Banyamulenge) Tutsi villages in the East of Zaire these Tutsi groups decided to join together to form a force, 'the Banyamulenge Tutsi', trained and armed with the help of Rwanda (RPA) in order to defend themselves. While Tutsi identity in the DRC was far less pronounced than in the two small sister states the effects of the genocide and refugee crises "signal[ed] the emergence of the ethnic Tutsi – numbering possibly half a million – as a politico-military force that had to be reckoned with".[62] This is a typical example among many where people formed or joined a social collectivity for security purposes. Many other such security providers such as the Mayi-Mayi have emerged as a direct result of extraordinary threats to people's insecurity in the region in the last few years. In conclusion, then, it has been successfully shown that if one is concerned with the security of the individual one has to take these social collectivities into account, i.e. make them referent objects, which the individual seeks as his/her 'protector'. Given that the only ground on which Ayoob's argument about regimes as referents can be upheld is that one or successive regime will eventually complete the

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[60] Job, p.27
[61] Job, p.22

process of state building and thus secure the population internally and externally. However, this argument is one-dimensional and linear and therefore inapplicable to the much more complex situation in Africa in general and in the Great Lakes in particular. The reason for this lies in the different political geography of Africa and its different international circumstances compared to the state building experience in Europe. In Europe as well as in Ayoob's model regimes by following their self-interest i.e. accumulation of power necessarily try to expand their authority over ever larger sections of population and territory, police these and extract resources from them. This, however, makes only sense were land is scarce and population density is high so that the gain of conquering land is higher than the loss of men. The fight over territory, however, especially with more sophisticated military technology needed ever greater resources which meant mobilization of great amounts of people and strengthening of ties with the hinterland for better exploitation. [63] African regimes on the other hand face quite different geographical and international circumstances and hence cost calculations. As Herbst convincingly argues, given the low population density in much of Africa and the high availability of land, the costs involved in projecting and asserting power and authority over peripheral regions is extremely large. In addition, the creation of new capitals by the colonisers corroborated the difficulty of extending the reach of the state since they were rarely older centres of power and built for export thus not strengthening rural-urban links. As a result the emphasis with regard to warfare in Africa is on exploiting people outside of the controlled territory rather than attempting to gain control over territory. This tendency was probably reinforced by the emergence of 'aid-states' during the Cold War era. By capturing the state a group would thus be able to enrich themselves by diverting aid funds and using its position to further exploit the rest of the country without ever being in control of the whole of the country's territory. Such a situation would break the linear development of Ayoob's state building since there would be no incentive for regimes to spatially expand control and thus contend strong regional collectivities . However, this is the situation in many African countries and one of the prime examples for it is Zaire under Mobutu. Mobutu used his position of power as representative of the state in order to, as detailed above, exploit his country's mineral resources and abusing aid money while fragmenting his physical power over the country. This renders Mobutu a very 'bad' state builder and hence delegitimises any claims to secure him in the interest of the population. But not only is the linearity of Ayoob's model untenable but also its one-dimensionality. It stipulates that the power at the centre, i.e. the

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[62] Lemarchand (2000), p.337
[63] Herbst, p.13, 20, 21

regime, will try to extend its control. However, as a result of the disappearance of aid states and privatisation of warfare these activities have become multidimensional. Again the current situation in the DRC clearly demonstrates this. There several groups, insurgents and armies are engaged in fighting over resources and often more specifically mines albeit for different reasons.[64] Such a situation is hardly compatible with state building in process since not capturing the state and expanding them but getting hold of often decentralised resources is the main aim. This further undermines Ayoob's exclusive focus on regime security.

Diverse threats: The Broadening Critique

Having established the need to secure protective social collectivities it will now be necessary to enquire what exactly these collectivities should secure people from i.e. identify the nature of threats. There has been a large amount of literature devoted to this problem. It has usually taken the form of a 'wide vs. narrow' debate in which people of orthodox conviction defend their exclusive focus on military or sometimes political threats (to the state) whereas being challenged by 'wideners' who claim to be able to identify a whole array of possible threats to state security.[65] These usually take the form of military, political, societal, economic and environmental/ecological threats.[66] The rise of the acceptance and popularity of alternative threats is generally linked to the empirical experience of Western Europe and North America in the last ten to twenty years. Experiencing a long peace and increasing European integration, military threats, though still of great importance, have been slowly joined by other 'threats' such as migration, the greenhouse effect, economic vulnerability and loss of political independence at the top of the security agenda. In this section then it will be argued that non-military threats are of great importance in general and with regard to the Great Lakes in particular. Thus by applying the Broadening Critique to the Great Lakes and including non-military threats a fuller security problematique of the regimes in the region will become apparent. This will help to better understand security strategies of regimes which would otherwise have remained obscured. However, it will also be shown that the strong state-centrism and often ethnocentrism of the Broadening Critique considerably weakens their usefulness for explaining insecurity in

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[64] see Johnson, Dominic (1999); Usually, a wide variety of motives and reasons can be identified. Underlying all of them is severe economic scarcity. Thus some fight for economic survival, others for financing warfare, some for enrichment etc.

[65] 'Wideners' include among others: Buzan, Barry (1991), Waever, Ole (1998), Mandel, Robert (1994), Haftendorn, Helga (1991), Ullman, Richard (1983).

[66] see, for example, Buzan, Barry (1991), Waever, Ole (1998); Mandel (1994) combines political and cultural threats

the region. Hence while highlighting the need to pay attention to non-military threats the widerners offer little guidance for finding out exactly what form these different kinds of threats can take with regard to the whole range of social collectivities. This realization already hints at the cultural, regional, historical and circumstantial specificity of threat perceptions which will be further detailed in the next section of this study. Mandel in his study of national security details what could possible be seen as economic, political/cultural, military and environmental threats to a state. Economically, a state is endangered especially by increasing global economic interdependence and competition which renders states more vulnerable and might lead to rapid economic changes which could have threatening social consequences. With regard to the environment, states are usually threatened by conflicts over resources as well as due to uneven impacts of environmental degradation (e.g. rising water levels due to the greenhouse effect). Finally, a state might be threatened culturally by the erosion of cultural legitimacy as a result of increasing diversification of values as well as by the erosion of cultural identity and distinctiveness as a result of globalisation of culture.[67] Applying this concept to regimes in the Great Lakes one sector offers significantly greater explanatory power than the other non-military sectors. Economic threats are of outmost importance to regimes in Africa because of the low level of economic development on the one hand and the often extreme dependence on world market prices for primary export commodities as well as on the IMF's seal of financial health which ensures existential aid inflows. That these are economic threats not only to regimes but also to the whole of society is convincingly illustrated by Chossudovsky with regard to Rwanda. By looking at he interplay of economic situation and the political crises just before the genocide he shows that "[t]he deterioration of the economic environment, which immediately followed the collapse of the international coffee market and the imposition of sweeping macroeconomic reforms by the Bretton Woods institutions, exacerbated simmering ethnic tensions and accelerated the process of political collapse."[68] In somewhat cruder language, when a country is "'down and out, [the IMF] squeezes the last drop of blood out of them. They turn up the heat until, finally, the whole cauldron blows up,'"[69] as Joseph Stiglitz, ex-chief economist of the World Bank once described this situation. Programmes with such an immediate and potentially devastating outcome certainly present immense threats to regimes since they are usually the ones held responsible for the situation or for collaborating with the international financial institutions. This power of these economic threats is best captured by Lapham who argues that "[i]f I were the president of a Third World nation

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[67] Mandel, p. 72, 73, 86, 87, 100, 101
[68] Chossudovsky, p.117

[…], I would be far more frightened by a well-dressed gentlemen bringing loans from the IMF or Citibank than by a bearded guerrilla muttering threats of revolution."[70] As has become clear >from the above discussion then, economic threats are an essential part of the security dimension of regimes in the Great Lakes. In this way then the application of the Broadening Critique has been useful by illuminating the importance of non-military threats. Apart from that, however, the Broadening Critique suffers from two shortcomings with regard to explaining insecurity in the Great Lakes. First and most important, most of the literature is very state-centric. This is quite understandable since most of the wideners work from within the mainstream of security studies which has been marked by emphasising national security. Although they have broken away >from an exclusive focus on military threats they advocate the broadening of the *national security* agenda. In addition this seems to be commonsensical since it is often the state that, in the West, is being sought for protection even against non-military threats. It is telling that in the latest book of the Copenhagen School (of security) which deliberately employs a constructivist analytical tool that allows people, through debate, to decide on threats and referents, the state is the predominant referent in all of the sectors.[71] For our purposes, however, this state-centrism is less useful since, as we have see, the state is one amongst many providers of security in the Great Lakes. Secondly, the Broadening Critique is also very ethnocentric. This again is due to its being rooted in national security studies which has only slowly been expanded from US to Western to Third World national security. While generally there have been "few analysts that have systematically considered the logic of perceived threats, constraints, and opportunities that lead to Third World security managers making the choices that they do"[72] wideners have been even limping behind this development as compared to followers of the orthodox approach. Hence the Broadening Critique has to be rendered of limited use for understanding non-military threats faced by regimes as well as social collectivities in the Great Lakes.

A happy marriage or a big mess?

At this point this study will bring the discussion of the debate to a close. This section will briefly summarise the findings of the study so far. It will do so by arguing that the 'debate' about the concept of security has been marked by considerable ignorance on the different sides, which obviously increases the difficulty to push the agenda forward.

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[69] Stiglitz quoted in Palast, Gregory (2001)
[70] Lapham quoted in Klaus, p.1
[71] Waever, p.37
[72] Job, p.28

After detailing possible reasons for this 'talking past each other' phenomenon this study will show that both concepts cannot properly explain insecurity in the Great Lakes and that a combination of the two, a marriage, is not only unrealistic but would perpetuate the deeper problems of both studies, namely their fixated and static approach to security. However, it will be argued that this conclusion leaves us with several possible referent objects and many types of threats without a model to make sense of them i.e. a big mess. The rest of the section will therefore express the need for a new concept and suggest in what ways it has to be different >from the others in order to avoid their mistakes.

Talking past each other

Security, claims Buzan, is like freedom or power an essentially contested concept. It entails an ideological aspect which cannot be verified or falsified by empiricism.[73] However, this does not imply that an exchange views is not possible. While, as stated, there has been much criticism from both the Third World Critique and the Broadening Critique aimed at the orthodox approach, the two strands themselves are barely ´talking´. There have been a few notable exceptions of course such as Ayoob how criticises the Broadening Critique while pushing his Third World agenda. Apart from these there seems to be a widespread conviction that Third World security (whether internal or external) is purely military and political and thus there is no need to go beyond that while wideners are often unconcerned with the insecurity dilemmas of Third World states. One reason for this could be that "[t]heory, like fashion, is generation- and time-specific. It is also space-bound. Theory is chosen not because it appeals to one's natural instincts, but because it best fits one's social and material circumstances."[74] But the intense attacks from both camps on the orthodox approach as well as their disinclination to engage in a active and fruitful debate with each other might suggest that there is more at stake that just formulating theories which suit oneself. Given the fact that the concept of security has for a long time been very underdeveloped but is an extremely powerful political tool since the referral to protecting national security has usually allowed states' leaders to use emergency measures and demand extraordinary powers, the battle over competing security notions becomes especially and understandably fierce.[75] Seen through this perspective the pressure of the Broadening Critique for a widening the security agenda of the state could be interpreted as an attempt to gain access to this authority rather than

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[73] Buzan (1991), p.7
[74] Acharya (1999), p.10
[75] Lipschutz, p.8; Buzan (1991), p.5

enlightening the debate in search for a more applicable concept. This seems to render the possibility of a closer engagement maybe even a merging, a 'happy marriage', unrealistic.

Failure to explain insecurity in the Great Lakes

Apart from the more practical difficulties, such a happy marriage will not prove amazingly helpful conceptually for two important reasons. First of all, neither one of them alone, nor both of the approaches taken together can properly explain the whole spectrum of insecurity in the Great Lakes. As we have seen, the Third World Critique is only successful in highlighting the military and political insecurity of regimes in the Great Lakes. However, it ignores the very important economic threats and pressures on these same regimes and cannot at all due to its state-centrism say much useful about the type of threats that the highly important other security providing social collectivities, and thus the majority of individuals in the Great Lakes, face. The Broadening Critique on the other hand, focussing on different non-military threats of Western states is only partially useful for illuminating the different threats regimes in the Great Lakes face due to the specificity and culturally relativity of threats and, just as the Third World Critique, is unable to shed light on the insecurity of most non-state security providers. Therefore it becomes very clear that even a combination of the two strands, however easy or realistic, will not enlighten the security problematique of people in the Great Lakes region in any more satisfactory and sufficient way. Secondly, underlying the failure of both approaches is a key handicap. Both approaches stipulate a referent object which is to be secured. And in both cases they choose the state or, in the case of the Third World Critique, the legal representative of the state. While both approaches justify this move in their ways the situation in the Great Lakes lets both of them miss the bigger picture. However, even when they would modify their concepts so as to include certain alternative security providers, their main handicap would still remain the same. Namely, it is the *stipulation* of referent objects, the stipulation of what we ought to secure rather than what the allegedly most basic units of concern i.e. the individuals[76] want to secure and actually do secure, that the situation in the Great Lakes region exposes as untenable. In a situation where no single referent object is at least dominant (but not all-encompassing) as it is in most of the West 'pick and choose' methods are self-defeating. While some providers will be more pervasive such as the family others can come and go quickly as a respond to changes in the political, economic or social environment. In other words, both approaches advocate security

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[76] Again, as mentioned above this is not meant in the liberal, rationalistic individualistic way.

concepts that are static and inflexible and thus unable to analyse dynamic and diverse perspectives of security. This combined with the ethnocentrism of the Broadening Critique and the state-centrism of both renders any marriage, happy or not, of little use for understanding insecurity in the Great Lakes.

A big mess and the need for a new concept

So what are we left with? Having had to reject the orthodox approach as well as both its critiques as of limited use for our purposes the picture looks bleak. It has been shown that regimes as well as other collective security providers can be referent objects. A few groups such as ethnic or rebel groups might be more apparent but the quantity of referent objects is not limited nor is the diversity. The importance of the economic sector for many regimes has been pointed out , though here again some governments might face different or more threats than others and some other security providers might protect from only one or many kinds of threats. In short, it is a mess. Given that, as has been shown, no one dominant referent exists, threats multiply and thus the whole picture becomes extremely complex. For any new model or concept for understanding security this poses two problems. First, the number of phenomena must be limited to a justifiable amount in order to avoid intellectual incoherence and thus "render it useless as an analytical tool"[77] as Ayoob warns. Secondly, the model has to be able to distinguish between 'normal' political issues, normal risk and security issues as well as understand the relationship between different kinds of threats. As Deudney almost famously argued:"[i]f everything that causes a decline in human well-being is labelled a 'security' threat, the term...becomes a loose synonym of 'bad'."[78] And thirdly, the alleged incongruence of say environmental threats and military threats must be addressed. Hence any approach claiming greater explanatory power has to find satisfying answers to these important challenges i.e. 'sort out the mess'.

A Way Forward?: Security is what people make of it

Having summarised the complex challenges the situation in the Great Lakes poses for a concept of security this study will now suggest a possible way forward in the security debate. More specifically, Waever's model of securitization is, it will be argued, a very good step forward in addressing the problems mentioned above. However, this study does not claim that this model is the final answer to the debate whether in general nor with regard to the Great Lakes. Nor is it the aim of this study to comprehensively apply

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[77] Ayoob (1997), p.121
[78] Deudney, p.463, 464

the model to the Great Lakes and thus identify all relevant referents and threats throughout the region. Such a task goes way beyond this study and most probably beyond any single study. Rather by highlighting the model's strength in accommodating different referents as well as threats and in distinguishing between security and non-security issues it will be argued that it offers a promising starting point for getting to grips with the complexities of security in a complex world. This will be done in the following way. First of all, the original model as developed by Waever will be set out and explained. Then it will be shown how this process of securitization can successfully solve the 'incoherence problem'. Thirdly, the superiority of the model compared to the above discussed will be exemplified with regards to the Great Lakes. In the final part of the study, it will be shown how two rather different accounts of security based on securitization exist in the West and the Great Lakes and how with the same model both accounts might be integrated into one security concept.

The speech act/securitization

As mentioned above, Waever's model takes an unconventional, social constructivist, starting point. Instead of stipulating, justified or unjustified, a specific legitimate referent object and specific legitimate threats, the model allows the process of securitization to specify these variables. Securitization is a process guided by a certain security logic or grammar. It involves a securitizing actor that makes a securitizing move, which if successful i.e. accepted by the audience, securitizes an issue into a threat to a certain referent object. A securitizing move is a speech act i.e. it is self-referential in the sense that it does not need to interpret or describe something else but "it is the utterance itself that is the act" [79] so that "calling something 'security' makes it into a security problem."[80] A securitizing actor tries to securitize by presenting something as an existential threat which requires absolute priority. In the end it is the audience that decides whether to accept[81] this claim or not so that "security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but *among* the subjects."[82] The success of such a speech act is dependent on the speech act's performance in satisfying the grammar of security, the 'social capital' of the enunciator and the facilitating or impeding features of the alleged threat and thus represents a combination of language and society. However, just as it is not necessary to use the word 'security' in a securitizing move, it is also not sufficient. It is

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[79] Waever, p.26
[80] Huysmans, p.92
[81] Waever points out that accepting will always involve a certain combination of consent and coercion. Therefore 'accepting' does not imply or presuppose certain open and fair debates and decision-making processes. Often, of course, the extent to which people really 'accepted' certain claims is difficult to reveal.
[82] Waever, p.31

only a successful securitization if an actor has managed not only to have his claim accepted but also has been 'granted permission' to break the normal rules of the (political) game which then in turn affect the order of the interunit environment. In other words successful securitization involves "existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules."[83]

The superiority of the securitization model

Having set out the model it will now be shown how the model is structurally superior compared to the other approaches discussed above. Secondly, Waever's approach, it will be argued, can also tackle the above mentioned three challenges to any new approach. Finally, using the example of ethnic groups it will be attempted to sketch a possible application of the approach to the Great Lakes.

The main reason for attempting to propose the securitization approach for analysing the security situation in the Great Lakes but also more generally is its sophisticated combination of flexibility and coherence which enables it to capture insecurity in the Great Lakes from its often very different expression in Europe, for example. Its key advantage is that it potentially and theoretically allows any kind of referent object, whether material or abstract. Similarly, it allows for a whole range of threats and sources of threats. This 'freedom of choice' can often present a much fuller and clearer picture as if it would only limited itself to certain sectors, actors or threats as seen above. In the end, life always involves some kind of risk but even if the majority of people think that a physical threat might be more existential because it often endangers a whole range of the achievements or structures there is no reason why this have to be so a priori. The beauty of the model then is that it lets the people decide what they reason to be a defendable object as well as an existential threat to it. Hence security is what people make of it. Such a system is much more culturally, regionally, circumstantially sensitive than the other three approaches. This is very helpful since it is not only other "countries [that] have different concepts of security"[84] it is also people within the same country who identify not only different threats and referents but also have different sensitivities to these threats. In addition, the concept's flexibility makes it also more dynamic. This is of particular importance in the Great Lakes where, due to the absence of a dominant central point of interaction (state), security providers and thus referents can be subject to greater change. Finally, using the securitization approach allows to gain a much fuller understanding of not only who's security is threatened but also of "who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent

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[83] Waever, p.26
[84] Haftendorn, p5

objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e. what explains when securitization is successful)."[85]

However, the securitization approach cannot only integrate a greater variety of referents and threats it also, and this is crucial for its usefulness, is able to limit the phenomena to be observed, distinguish between everyday issues and security issues and address the alleged incongruence of different types of threats (such as environmental and military threats). The model's limiting mechanism is straightforward. While potentially allowing all kinds of phenomena only when securitization moves are existent is it necessary to examine them. And even in situation with many such moves the number of successful securitizations limits the number of phenomena further. Distinguishing between normal political issues and security issues is more tricky, though this is true for all approaches. But again, if "an argument with…[a] particular rhetorical and semiotic structure[s] achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed…we are witnessing a case of securitization."[86] Hence it is clear then that not every 'bad' is a security issue. Only if they are so 'bad' that we accept the breaking of rules since non-avoidance of the 'bad' would question the whole fundament of the rules. To be fair many people concerned about widening the concept of security argue against non-military threats of being on equal footing with military threats since "security from violence is a primal human need, because loss of life prevents the enjoyment of all other goods."[87] While this is a very popular view, it has two problems. Unless one supports the realist view of the world as a system of perennial possibility of war, a society that takes physical security as given since it has eradicated most forms of social and political violence within it and has experienced an enduring period of peace with its neighbours might reconfigure what constitutes security. This, as it obviously is argued here, is what may be happening in the Western world. Another problem, however, this view despite its popularity is socially constructed and not universal. Other threats such as of economic nature could at least as much be seen as preventing the enjoyment of all other goods. In the words of a analyst commenting on the current war in the DRC:"[t]heir [military wars] greatest danger, one greater than loss of life and limb, is that they blind the leadership to other forces that threaten Africa" because "[m]ilitary wars kill in thousands; economic wars in millions."[88] However, although there is no pre-set hierarchy of threats, there exists hierarchy among perceptions of threats. This is because people do give different weight to

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[85] Waever, p.32
[86] Waever, p.25
[87] Deudney, p.462
[88] Tandon, Yash, p.9

different values and thus referents. More generally security itself is usually weighted against other values since for "most of us, security is not an absolute value."[89] Hence Waever proposes two ways of weighting different types of threat. On the one hand different degrees of securitization in different sectors point at the relative importance of threats. On the other hand, in a more concrete way, the relative importance of threats become clear when sectors 'clash'. Thus it depends on the people whether the military realm will be prioritised over all others. The difference to the other approaches is that even if the military threats are most prominent this time it is not only justified and not stipulated but also one could say something about their *relative* prominence over others.

Sketching a case from the Great Lakes

Having demonstrated the structural superiority of the securitization approach this study will now show its superiority with regard to explaining security in the Great Lakes. However, due to limited space it will only be possible to sketch rather than comprehensively test the usefulness of the new concept. This is in line with the main argument of the study that this type of (social constructivist) model is a step forward in the right direction and not the last step towards a 'final' concept.

Taking the example of the relationship between the authochtones and the Banyamulenge Tutsi in Eastern Zaire/DRC the securitization process will illustrate how the authochtones due to the ethnically based system of land distribution started securitizing their group to protect it from economic threats posed by the Banyamulenge. Further it will be shown how this issue was first politicised and finally successfully securitized resulting in widespread violence and becoming heavily intertwined with the two Congo wars as well as stimulating them.

In pre-colonial times the distribution of land in Eastern Congo was regulated by a hierarchical patron-client relationship which was based on social identity. With the introduction of the 'bifurcated state' by the Belgian colonists the ethnic basis of access to land was reinforced and expanded and thus ethnicity was institutionalised. Apart >from the kinyarwanda speakers already living in the Congo for a long time, there was a great influx of Rwandans into the Congo between 1937 and 1955 due to the Belgians need of labour force there and in the period after 1959 due to the revolution in Rwanda.[90] The frustration about their exclusion from access to land sparked first clashes between the Banyarwanda and the 'indigenous' native authorities so that for

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[89] Ullman, p.130
[90] Vlaasenroot, p.67

"the Banyarwanda, it became clear that only national, civic citizenship could secure their economic and political rights."[91] The 1972/73 nationality and land laws which finally enabled Tutsi to acquire land and increased their economic and political standing led to more resentment on parts of the authochtones and to challenges of the latter to the Tutsi's newly acquired citizenship. Thus land issues between the two groups were slowly politicised. Authochtones politicised the perceived economic threats as posed by the new political and economic rights of the mainly Tutsi-Banyarwanda whereas the Tutsi felt threatened by the authochtones' campaigns challenging the Tutsis' citizenship and thus threatened the basis of their economic existence. However, following the withdrawal of the Banyarwanda's citizenship in 1982 this conflict further intensified. Lacking Congolese citizenship the Banyarwanda were also faced with the increased strength of the authochtones' political power as a result of the democratisation process and of Mobutu's desire to win their support. The higher intensity of the conflict finally led to securitization of their ethnic group by authochtones and the Mobutu government so that in 1993 "it resulted in acts of violence against the Banyarwanda, which spread 'like the fire in a dry forest' and finally led to an open war in which local, ethnically based militia such as Mayi-Mayi and Bangilima, became actively involved. For the defense of economic interests and political representation, ethnicity proved to be the perfect instrument."[92] With the arrival of the Hutu refugees after the Rwandan genocide the conflict turned from an anti-Banyarwanda into an anti-Tutsi one with authochtones and the relatively 'rich' Hutu refugees joining ranks and separating the ethnic structure of Eastern Congo on Rwandan Tutsi-Hutu ethnic divide lines. The authochtones were further securitized by some actors such as Anzuluni Bembe who "held…[the Banyamulenge-Tutsi] responsible for the arrival of these refugees and the growing insecurity in the region."[93] As an result militias for armed resistance were formed. By 1996 securitization became increasingly successful and houses of Banyamulenge-Tutsi were raided, they were threatened to be expelled and authochtones militias and the army "openly started attacking Banyamulenge."[94] One of the best illustrations of successful securitization at work is Kabila's instigation of violence against his former Banyamulenge allies where "he portrayed the rebellion as the next aggression of Tutsi-led nations and urged the Congolese population to participate in a popular war aiming at expelling, once and for all, the 'Tutsi-invaders' from Congo. The result was a horrendous carnage of ethnic Tutsi all over the country, in what could be described as 'an outburst of xenophobic rage, encouraged by the

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[91] Vlaasenroot, p.67
[92] Vlaasenroot, p.73
[93] Vlaasenroot, p.78
[94] Vlaasenroot, p.81

Kinshasa media'".[95] Here then a securitizng actor (Kabila), made a move to securitize a referent (the Congolese but actually authochtones) from military threats (the rebellion). This move was successful since he managed to 'break free of rules he is normally bound by'(non-violence) and it heavily affected the interunit relationship (authochtones vs. Banyamulenge-Tutsi ethnic violence). Having shown the usefulness of the securitization model for examining security in the Great Lakes it is has been seen that it is usually military and economic threats that are being securitized. It is also worth pointing out this case convincingly counters the often made criticism of the danger of taking sub-state units as referent object. It is claimed that one must distinguish between international and domestic concepts of security. While the latter might endanger people's live it is not what we usually understand under *international* security. The question then becomes, of course, what that might mean in the case of the Great Lakes. Apart from recent tendencies of the 'international community' to start describing civil wars as threats to 'international peace and security' (in order to be legally able to take action) what the Great Lakes demonstrate is that sub-units can be very 'international'. The movements of the RPF from Uganda to Rwanda into Congo, Interahamwe >from Rwanda to Congo with some raiding into Burundi etc. The whole region has been victim of immense internationalisation of ethnicity which makes sub-unit actors like ethnic groups very important and powerful actors or as Lemarchand argues: "[m]obilized ethnicity thus transforms international boundaries into a sieve, allowing free passage of armed groups from one national arena to another."[96] Summing up, it has been shown that the securitization approach is superior to the other discussed approaches structurally as well as in capturing insecurity of people (mainly security from economic and military threats) and in the Great Lakes. It is not only more flexible and dynamic but also does not fall victim to intellectual incoherence and thus constitutes an important contribution to pushing ahead the debate on security.

Putting things together: Two securities or one?

Having shown the superiority of the securitization approach there remains one problem: Waever uses his model in a quite ethnocentric way. He does not attempt to incorporate, in any systematic way, the security experiences of Third World states and peoples. His application of the model shows that in a generalised sense environmental and societal threats seemed to become increasingly securitized in the West whereas

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[95] Vlaasenroot, p.86
[96] Lemarchand (2000), p.344

this study has shown that military and basic economic threats seemed to be prevalent in the Great Lakes and many other African countries. Hence one might legitimately ask what that means for the concept of security. Similarly, if the state is the most dominant referent object contrasting with a range of social collectivities in the Great Lakes does and can security mean the same thing given the very different nature, status and workings of these units as well as of the threats their facing? Given our social constructivist approach security is what people make of it. This of course will depend on a whole range of factors such as circumstances, culture, history etc.. However, although 'objectively' the securities and might look quite different they could mean the same for the people experiencing them. This is because referents are only securitized when they are faced by *existential* threats. What for one is existential might not be for another. But if, whatever the threat, if for both different threats are to *same* level existential we can speak of one concept of security. Then the question becomes whether environmental or societal threats for people in the West are to the *same* level existential as military and economic threats to people in the Great Lakes. Although rather arbitrary it could be argued that the same level will spark the same degree of reaction *ceteris paribus*[97]. Then if the answer is yes, we speak of the same or similar security. If the answer is no, we either have two concepts of security or only one and the other is not due to the relative inferiority. Assuming two concepts means that one unit is insecure (by its own standards i.e.securitization) but less so than another because it does not experience the same level and thus not react with the same degree. Lacking the expertise, time and space to answer such a question it should be noted, however, that it is possible albeit theoretically that one state might feel threatened by societal threats as much as another by military threats. On an individual level that would resemble someone securitizing his honour just as much as someone else his life. In the end both would risk their life, one to protect his honour (like in a duel) just as the other one to protect his life. Another question that is raised by the study is that of relevance of social collectivities for security in the West. Given that social collectivities are referent objects in the Great Lakes what does that mean for studying security in the West? Here again the securitization is helpful since it selects the relevant units and given the centrality of the state in the West a good analysis of security in the West has to go beyond the state but not excessively so i.e. the state is probably the single most important social collectivity.

Conclusion

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[97] Given the same resources, opportunities etc. to do so.

Summing up, it has been shown that the orthodox approach to security is of little use in explaining the incredible complexity of security in the Great Lakes. This is so because the state cannot be assumed to be the protector of its citizens in the Great Lakes. Apart from that national security theory misses the picture in a region were security strategies of regimes rather than of states can be identified and were most insecurity is internal. Moreover, it has been also revealed that the Third World Critique's bias towards regime security, though successfully highlighting internal challenges to these, is untenable given the strength of other security providers in power and legitimacy. This bias applies equally to the Broadening Critique which is also rather ethnocentric. The study pointed out that there is much potential for that approach since it illuminates other important threats (such as economic threats) but in its current state it cannot considerable contribute to our understanding of insecurity in the Great Lakes. Finally, having dismiised the usefulness of a combination of the two, this study suggested that the debate and our understanding might be pushed forward by a social constructivist approach such as the securitization approach discussed here. Having demonstrated its superiority over the other approaches it still leaves us with important questions regarding the relationship between different and necessarily relative securitizations of peoples. Hence it will be concluded that more thought has to be given to this approach if the debate wants to reach the next level. It is hoped that this study can make a very modest first step.

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