

The »Global Class«

The Power of Disposition Over (Global) Space as a New Dimension of Class Structuration

A post-Marxist ghost-buster essay

© Anil Jain¹

The »global class« recognises no limits. How else could it be called »global«? It is at home everywhere, but it will not stay anywhere for long: Its hardly ever challenged rule over global space does not allow its members to settle, and its global presence demands global mobility. They are the »business-class-nomads«, the restless, placeless »agents« of a new age – meeting at airport-lounges, communicating via the curled tracks of the Internet, and recognising each other by the »codes« of cosmopolitanism.

However, what makes the global class a class »in itself« and especially »for itself«, is not at all its closure and unity, but exactly its (expansionist) world-*openness* – for it is a truly individualised class, heterogeneous and diffuse, but in its striving into the outside, into global space, it is totally *self-concerned*. Thus, while the global »proletariat« – the »underdogs«, the powerless and marginalised – have abandoned hope of a »world-revolution«, of a *substantial* improvement of their position, and are tied to »locality«, the global class already conquered the globe by its subcutaneous networks.

1. About the History and Historical Framing of Class Theory

The global class is the ruling class of the »Global Age« (Albrow 1996) which is about to supersede the epoch of modernity – a historical formation »fixed« within the borders of nations. With the dawn of this new global age, class structuration is based on different grounds and appears in configurations different from the past.

¹ Anil Jain holds an MA (Political Science) and a Dr. phil (Sociology) from Ludwig-Maximilian Universität (LMU) Munich, Germany. For the last three years he worked as a researcher as part of the research project „Reflexive Modernization“ based at LMU.

In the 20th century, interventions by the welfare state in accordance with the interest in economic and political stability of the capitalist class resulted in a limited, however, immense redistribution of wealth – the source of which lay to a large extent in the profits from the international division of labour. Maybe that's why the ever-increasing pauperisation as well as the proletarian revolution did not occur (in the West) as predicted by Marx. That obviously en-forced to modify orthodox Marxist class theory. And similarly, the current transformation of the capitalist (world-)system demands a re-formulation of the theoretical premises. But before painting the contours of a »globally renovated« class theory, it is advisable to recall some prominent approaches that tried to deal with the »old« problem of »middle class« – as they represent an important starting point for the following considerations:

The original class model of Marx – as it is outlined in »*Manifesto of the Communist Party*« (1888 [1848]) and in the (unfortunately unfinished) last chapter of the third volume of the »*Capital*« (1909 [1894]) – focussed on the antagonism of capital and labour and exclusively related the »objective« class position to the ownership of means of production (or land). This model, however, failed to explain the contradictory social position of the »middle class(es)«, the medium social strata, which rapidly gained in number owing to the (above mentioned) politics of redistribution taking place at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century. That's why, critically against Marx, Weber, in his concept, tried to consider the professional position (»*Erwerbsklasse*«), which depends on a person's chances in the labour market, in addition to possession (»*Besitzklasse*«). Both dimensions (with their multiple differentiations) accumulate in »social class«, which somehow corresponds with the »status group« (German: »*Stand*«) of feudal society – as social class, according to Weber, is marked by a typical lifestyle, tradition and attitude, and can be believed as socially rather »closed«. (Individual) mobility to other social classes is not encouraged, and the advancement of, for example, a member of the social class of workers to the petit or even the grand bourgeoisie is a hard way and in reality rarely happens (see *Economy and Society*; ch. IV).

In his considerations about »*The Class Structure of Advanced Societies*« (1973) Anthony Giddens connects to Weber's concept: His explanation of the enormous stability of middle class positions – which, theoretically, should be characterised by a special tension due to their contradictory intermediary placement – roots in what he calls »market capacity«, that is e.g. relevant qualifications/skills. Their skills provide middle class people with a bargaining power that one should not underestimate and thus secure their social and professional position even if they lack other means. It is, however, central that, according to Giddens (and in a rather exaggerated contrast to Weber), we would not find a potentially unlimited number

of different class positions/locations in society but a distinction into upper-, middle and lower class, which replaced the »old« antagonism of bourgeoisie and proletariat (see ch. 6).

In Erik O. Wright's neo-Marxist class model, this antagonism is scattered, too, for he, in addition to economic assets, refers to competencies in the relations of production (i.e. the control over labour, means of production and investment etc.) for the determination of class location. By this »trick«, the petit bourgeoisie, who may dispose over a certain capital but do not have any control competencies in the relations of production, can be differentiated from the »omnipotent« capitalist class as well as from the »managerial class«, which participates in control, and the proletariat, which is »powerless« in both respects (see *Varieties of Marxist Conceptions of Class Structure*). In the volume »Classes« (1985) this model is further differentiated and supplemented in direction towards Weber/Giddens, as Wright here additionally takes into account the factor of personal skills (see pp. 82ff.).

Although an underlying class structuration is still effective – which especially becomes apparent whenever financial resources are limited and new social conflicts arise (see also *ibid.: Class Counts*) – even »modernised« class concepts like those of Giddens and Wright cannot mirror the enormously complex social network of »advanced« societies, particularly not on a »phenomenological«, i.e. describing level. For advanced societies are not simply characterised by a large »middle class«, but must be seen as highly »individualised« – which now Giddens would stress, too (see *Modernity and Self-Identity*).

2. The Changed Conditions (of Class) in Individualised Society

In order to prevent the tendencies of simplification which class theory is accused of slipping into, in mainstream sociology models of stratification are preferred. Stratified societies are also structured hierarchically and the members of different strata are characterised by differences in possession, education and prestige etc. But – unlike in class society – the edges are rather »soft« and passages are easy. For civil society promotes – according to its self-description – social mobility and – in theory – grants a certain equality of chances (see e.g. Parsons: *An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification* and Dahrendorf: *Life Chances*). There is thus no (open) class conflict, but (ideally) – through the mediation of public institutions – social fights take the form of a »productive« competition that leads to new solutions.

However, the supposed equality of chances, which constitutes the (ideological) legitimisation of the stratification hierarchy (see as an example Davis/Moore: *Some Principles of Stratification*), was and is rather fiction. The limiting social boundaries

still exist and just take different forms. Especially in the cultural sphere, which is a more and more relevant field of social distinction, this becomes apparent. In his empirically grounded »*Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*« (1984 [1979]), Pierre Bourdieu for example showed that the aesthetic preferences correlate with class location, and he thus proved that we also have to deal with an aesthetic dimension of class structuration: The achieved »symbolic capital« incorporates in the habitus – i.e. the (class-)specific attitudes, lifestyle and behavioural norms (see also *ibid.*: *The Logic of Practice*). Symbolic or *cultural capital* (education, titles, »cultural goods« etc.) as well as *social capital* (personal relations and networks, - memberships etc.) can be converted into economic capital – and vice versa (see *ibid.*: *The Forms of Capital*). In effect, social space is on all levels – economically, socially and culturally/aesthetically – divided into clearly demarcated »power fields«, which are considerably overlapping (see *ibid.*: *Social Space and the Genesis of »Classes«*). On the other hand: Bourdieu's empirical results are only valid for the specific situation in France with its comparatively sharp class distinctions – a fact that has been thoroughly criticised. In addition, since the 1980s, everywhere in the (so-called) »advanced societies« (even in France), lifestyle no longer necessarily corresponds with class position. Not only do inconsistencies of status become prevalent (that is, for example, people with a high level of education but low income), shop assistants playing golf or the millionaire happily doing his shopping at a discount chain are proof of an increasing »individualisation«.

Along with ongoing socio-economic change we, today, face a transformation in the relations of inequality, which, roughly summarised, manifests in a »*Differentiation of Life-Styles*« (Zablocki/Kanter-Moss 1976) and an »*Aesthetization of Everyday Life*« (Featherstone 1992). Ulrich Beck traces the primary cause of this change to a general increase and proliferation of wealth. That lead to an »elevator-effect«, resulting in a (phenomenal) »levelling« of (still immense) social inequality and thus in a far-reaching individualisation. Beck, however, does not locate the major field of conflict in the sphere of aesthetics, nor is it – like in the »old« industrial society – situated in economy. In the affluent society of the modern welfare state questions of the distribution of wealth are no more central. Instead, questions of *the distribution of risks*, which are highly dependent on knowledge and perception, are at core. And, what is more, Beck asserts that modern risks, the definition of which is highly contested, have basically egalitarian, »democratic« character, as they neither respect social boundaries nor state borders. (*See Risk Society*)

This view, however, can be doubted: local and global space is divided into different risk-fields and -classes. Because of their wealth, some people will be able to prevent certain risks (e.g. by an autonomous water supply and processing). They live in exclusive local reservations that provide not only a better infrastructure but

are characterised by »natural« advantages (like, say, an elevated location). And to come to the global level: the (man made) changes in world climate, which we are expecting, will, for sure, not hit every region to the same extent. In addition, because of their superior provision of (natural and economic) resources, some countries will be able to take more effective counter-measures than others. That, of course, is a result of the structural inequalities favouring the industrial countries in the system of international division of labour, which still do exist and have constituted – beneath the class structuration within nations – classes of nations. Immanuel Wallerstein therefore divides the world into periphery, semi-periphery and the core (see *The Modern World System*; ch. 7). Yet, in account of the (partial) success of the so called »Newly Industrialising Countries« (NICs) like China or Malaysia in the 1980s, today even Wallerstein admits that it is not only economic factors and (inter-)dependence that play a crucial role for international class relations, but multiple political and cultural factors have to be considered subsequently (see *ibid.*: *Geopolitics and Geoculture*).

In global society, politics, economy and culture thus constitute an interrelated complex, and it is not at all true, as Arjun Appadurai asserts (see *Disjunction and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy*), that the world-wide flows of commodities, capital and ideologies etc. are uncoupled. To the contrary, capitalism appears to be increasingly »culturalised« and, more and more, it relies on knowledge. On the other hand, along with this process, culture becomes »capitalised« (which, according to some commentators, can be considered as the »signature« of the postmodern age) and social networks as well as the personality are formed according to the needs of economy (see also Sennett: *The Corrosion of Character*). Both tendencies show a big effect on the social and political sphere.

3. Globalisation Processes and the Rule Over Global Space as a New Dimension of Class Structuration

To determine this influence, it is, for a first step, necessary to ask about the »nature« of globalisation, which is a strong motor of the deepening of mutual penetration of the different social spheres and, thus prepares the ground for the »colonisation« of society and culture by economy – as Habermas would express it.

3.1. »Background« Voices: The Meaning of (Globalised) Space for Social Theory and the Theoretical Expression of Class Relations in the Global Age

For good reasons, globalisation and space both play an increasingly important role in the current debate in social sciences: Only by appealing to the concept of space, a »meaningful« discursive structuration of a social field appearing to be more and

more scattered can be achieved. In a time that seeks to eliminate its historical consciousness in order to devotionally subscribe to the dictate of the powers of market (see as an example Fukuyama: *The End of History?*), spatial categories, however often not differentiated properly, do come to the foreground (see Sayer: *The Difference that Space Makes*). Thus, Fredric Jameson is able to claim: »[...] a model of political culture appropriate to our own situation will necessarily have to raise spatial issues as its fundamental organising concern.« (*Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*; p. 51)

Coincidentally, a (sharpened) consciousness of the problems of space and its theoretical »expressions« evolves. Edward Soja e.g. points out that space is a dialectical category which can never be »fixed« nor be fully conceived and which is – in the first place – always *socially constructed*, too. That is why one has to consider the social conditions of production and reproduction of space (see *Postmodern Geographies*; ch. 5). And Doreen Massey (additionally) makes clear that space cannot be separated from time (nor from society) but that they are, in the contrary, inseparably interweaved. The current switching to spatial semantics is, unfortunately, rather one-sided and does not take account of this coupling (see *Politics and Space/Time*). Such, both space-conscious and space-critical, views of the social sphere by neo-Marxist authors rely primarily on the »revolutionary« thoughts of the Marxist anti-dogmatic Henri Lefebvre. Already in the 1970s Lefebvre revealed that the survival of the capitalist social order is at present dependent on its ability to control (global) space, and that is why a spatial view has to complement historical analysis (see *The Production of Space*).

But, of course, spatiality not only intruded into social theory following Lefebvre, and global space is not exclusively »measured« and »mapped« in a neo-Marxist way. Within mainstream sociology especially Anthony Giddens (who during his career more and more distanced from Marxism) contributed to an adequate appreciation of the space-dimension. As he notes: »All social life occurs in, and is constituted by, intersections of presence and absence in the ›fading away‹ of time and the ›shading off‹ of space.« (*Time, Space and Regionalisation*; p. 283) This kind of – timely embedded – spatial consciousness directly transfers to his current understanding of modernity, which, according to Giddens, inherently possesses a globalising tendency and is marked by the increasing disjuncture of spatial patterns from time (limits) (see *The Consequences of Modernity*). In consequence, the understanding of the state as a leakproof »container« must be overcome (see also Taylor: *Beyond Containers*). It is most important to realise that globalisation, which is only falsely identified as a merely economic process, shows global effects in the sense of a determination of social, cultural and individual life-patterns.

Consequently, Roland Robertson in his popular definition points out that globalisation means a spatial compression, which leads, on the individual level, to a global consciousness (see *Globalization*; pp. 8ff.). And he stresses that globalisation dialectically coincides with localisation, which is why he now prefers the hybrid-term of »glocalization« (see *ibid. Glocalization*). As Robertson applies the term it is, however, ideological – for he ignores that even though globalisation and localisation are indeed analogous processes they are *socially and spatially highly separated/distinctive*. This is what Zygmunt Bauman has in mind when he critically asserts: »Globalization [...] divides as it unites – the causes of division being identical with those which promote the uniformity of the globe.« (*Globalization – The Human Consequences*; p. 2)

Bauman thus rather focuses on the »centrifugal«, socially polarising dimension of space, especially in the context of globalisation. Of course, that is not really a new point in the debate. The critique of globalisation as being an uneven process can be traced back to Marx, and is prominent in several other current approaches: Bourdieu e.g. does not only apply spatial metaphors when using terms like »social space« or »power field« (see above). Additionally, he conceptualises space as a distinctive resource and points out that the division(s) of physical space are paralleled in social space. Local position and place of residence are indicators for social location: wealth and poverty are clustered at certain »sites«. The (exclusive) appropriation of space might therefore be understood as an expression of symbolic violence (see *Site Effects*). And likewise Wallerstein (see *op. cit.*), of course, points to spatial polarisations when differentiating between periphery, semi-periphery and the core. According to Giddens (who here draws a lot on the work of the Chicago School), a similar distinction is valid for local contexts, i.e. even smaller (social) spaces are divided into central and peripheral regions. The centre or core is occupied by »the established« and only the peripheral spatial zones are left to »the outsiders« (see again *Time, Space and Regionalisation*).

Through ongoing globalisation, this zoning of local and global space eventually appears in different ways than in the past. Saskia Sassen e.g. points out that globalisation mainly takes (its) place in the »global cities« New York, London, Tokyo etc. (see *The Global City*). These urban nodes constitute a subcutaneous power structure, i.e. the centre is no more a »closed«, homogenous region but a networked global structure. Or as Hardt and Negri formulate: it is »a decentred and deterritorialising apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm with its open, expanding frontiers« (*Empire*; p. xii). This global (imperial) network-structure is nevertheless concentrated in only a few specific places. At the same time, the periphery diffusely invades into the central regions, although – as a the empty wholes of the net – it still stays isolated. It is »home« to the (localised)

global underclass (see also Lash/Urry: *Economies of Signs and Space*; esp. pp. 28ff. and pp. 165ff.).

Consequently, class theory in the global age must in any case – and also empirically – analyse global space(s). There is a clear correlation between the time-space compression in globalised capitalism (with its flexible accumulation) and the conditions of inequality. Where acceleration is necessary (see also Virilio: *Speed and Politics*) in order to guarantee turnover and profit in the unstable, crisis-prone system of bubble economies, the disposition over spaces (of trans-action) plays a crucial role. As David Harvey puts it: »[...] the ability to influence the production of space is an important means to augment social power. In material terms this means that those who can affect the spatial distribution of investments in transport and communications, in physical and social infrastructures, or the territorial distribution of administrative, political, and economic powers can often reap material rewards.« (*The Condition of Postmodernity*; p. 233) And Derek Gregory concludes: »Spatial structure is not [...] merely the arena within which class conflicts express themselves [...] but also the domain within which – and, in part, through which – class relations are constituted.« (*Ideology, Science, and Human Geography*; pp. 121f.)

Space itself becomes thus a central dimension of class structuration: In addition to capital ownership and (relevant) know how we have to consider the power of disposition over (global) space. As it seems, the conditions rather reversed in comparison to the times of early capitalism: It is no more the proletariat whose orientation is trans-national (while the capitalist class engages with the national state). In the global age, the marginalised are exactly characterised by their (even mental-utopian) fixation to the local level, whereas the avant-garde has already transcended the narrow borders of nation: the global (under-)class of the localised is subordinated to a diffuse but nevertheless clearly marked global class. As Leslie Sklair states: »The transnational capitalist class [...] is transnational in at least three senses. Its members tend to have global rather than local perspectives [...]; they tend to be people from many countries, more and more of whom begin to consider themselves ›citizens of the world‹ as well as of their places of birth; and they tend to share similar lifestyles, particularly patterns of luxury consumption of goods and services [...]« (*Sociology of the Global System*; S. 71 and see also *ibid.*: *The Transnational Capitalist Class*) Already in the 1970s, James Field spoke of a transnational new tribe, guided by similar assumptions (see *Transnationalism and the New Tribe*). To Field, however, this new tribe is highly individualised: The global class has many faces and facets. But even if Sklair should prove wrong with his third assumption (the share of similar lifestyles), its members have at least one thing in common: Be it intentionally or not, the global class serves to the

functioning of flexible capitalism in the final stage of the capitalist world system – and in this way becomes at least a class *in itself*. Following Terry Eagleton, one therefore ought to call it one of the most misleading »*Illusions of Postmodernism*« (1996) to believe that social segmentation vanquished and the antagonism of classes was replaced by a peaceful co-existence of plural lifestyle-groupings. Maybe it is just the diffusion and liquefaction of known structures that now appears to be »manifest«, i.e. clear and obvious, but there is indeed a latent – and thus even more effective – concretion of spatial class divisions.

3.2. Beyond Discourse: »Concrete« Globalisation – The Global Exploitation of (local) Difference

Globalisation is, as already described above (referring to Robertson), a dialectical process of spatial extension and localisation. Specifically analysed, it, however, becomes obvious that the starting point, the motor (and fuel) of its movement is not a global consciousness but rather local differences. Without local differences, globalisation could not »take place«. The relocation of production sites e.g. only makes sense if the local factors there are supportive (like, say, lower wages). And fashionable Hongkong Cinema, which fuses Eastern and Western influences, is only as popular (and profitable) because it still kept a certain local charm.

The global class lives on the detection and exploitation of (such) local differences. In this search, it behaves ruthlessly, does not show respect for local particularities, and ignores »cultural borders« as well as »taboos« (the challenge and transcendence of which, of course, can be a desirable target if pursued from »the inside«). This is not only true for the »agents« of global capital and multinational corporations, who collect patents of genes from tropical plants or make use of the international disparities in wages. Other groups of people, too, exploit local structures. In many cases, one even pretends to have a »real«, unselfish interest in »the other« – and possibly believes that even oneself while teaching Yoga or studying traditional Chinese medicine. Single elements are, however, extracted from their cultural context – and, thus, are also detached from its negative aspects. A globalisation of local patterns, which is at the same time compounded with economic »interest«, consequently always means a violent, alienating abstraction and disembedding. The Western Yoga-teacher e.g. usually does not seem to be interested too much in the repressions of the caste system in India – which is still alive and has a religious background that is hard to separate from the techniques and the idea of Yoga. The concern for »foreign« cultures is in most cases rather shallow. Either some of their components serve as a projection screen for own desires, they are idealised (like e.g. the feudal structures of Tibetan Buddhism) and are in effect bent and »instrumentalised«; or the »discovery« of the »alien« is

exclusively regarded in terms of usability. Only that which serves to the »own« goals is perceived and evaluated. The (useless) »remains«, which constitute the biggest part, do not count.

So, as we learnt: the global class takes advantage of the spatial disparities. It promotes an *eclectic imperialism* and abuses the local differences for its purposes. So it must continuously put out its feelers over the globe. While in the class relations of industrial capitalism it was still the property of productive means that counted most, in the post-fordist capitalism of the global age – in which knowledge, services and information technologies play the main role – the power of disposition over global space appears as the key factor. Whoever shows world-wide »presence« and controls global space will govern the world of the global age. Therefore, (besides the possession of relevant »know how«) it is most important to have access to the necessary technological and material resources and to have the possibility to travel, i.e.: to hold the right passport. For to be flexible and mobile are most demanded qualities. Those who meet these criteria and (are able to) move freely in global space will secure their share in global wealth even in future times. The world belongs to them.

Right at the other end, there are the »losers« of globalisation: the localized »proletariat«, the marginalised of the globe. They are locked out, are confined to their local structures, cut off from global space. Fixed to place, they have to deal with the processes which, along with the (seemingly) »natural power« of globalisation, take over their spaces, but without having alternatives and possibilities of control. Only by using (illegal) secret ways, they can break the borders drawn for them. But even if they manage to get through to the global metropolises, they stay excluded. Stigmatized as »illegals« etc., they lead a shadow existence. Their precarious (legal and economic) status limits their (real and cognitive-imaginative) spaces of mobility. They share this »destiny« with the internal periphery of the core regions: the jobless, the homeless and those who dare to oppose the mobility-regime of global society. The only chance of a substantial change would be their global association – and thus the (revolutionary) challenge of the rule over global space of the global class.

3.3. Post-Script(um): Global Spectres and Virtual Differences – The End of »Locality« through the Globalisation of Space

A challenge of the rule of the global class, however, appears to be an arduous task. First of all, the class of the localised lacks the necessary resources (»know how«, capital, technology etc.). In addition, the fixation to local structures is exactly its characteristic. A world-wide alliance of the peripheries will consequently face insurmountable barriers. Secondly: the global class is, as mentioned above, an

opponent rather hard to catch. By its polymorphy and its diffuseness, it escapes from identifying seizure and in that way, resistance against its practice has no point of departure. The global class forms the world according to its needs, but remains invisible. It carries a ghost-like character, is impossible to be »grasped«, and therefore will never need to fear the spectre of (global) proletariat. Hence, the global class is perhaps the first class in history that primarily is an opponent to itself. The class rule of the bourgeoisie in the 19th century resulted in the formation of the antagonistic proletarian class, which – at least in the welfare states of Western industrial countries – could put through many of its aims. The localized proletariat of the global age is, however, left to (a class *in*) *itself*. Marginally placed and locally scattered as it is, it can hardly become a class *for itself* (and thus *against* the global class). Accordingly, the global class is a class without a »real« antagonist (and only for this reason it is justified to speak of the spectre of the proletariat). The global class has to face resistance only on the local level not on a global scale.

Yet, its rule is endangered: by its own acts. For exactly through globalisation, of which it is the »agent«, it undermines its economic foundation. Globalisation leads to an unspecific equalisation of world-wide spaces and levels the differences that constitute the basis of its »parasitic« existence: the exploitation of the local life-worlds. To prevent its destiny to fulfil, the global class can only take one »exit«: It must become »creative«, must artificially generate local differences. Therefore, in the global age, difference is simulated in order to extract profit from the created differential (see also Baudrillard: *Simulacra and Simulation*). As a result, »concrete« place and its specifics, which are rooted in a »real« (i.e. experienced) culture and history, fade away. The final effect is a kind of »Disney World« of virtual local landscapes. Their »particularities« have only superficial character (see also Zukin: *Landscapes of Power*), and they can be freely transformed to adapt to the ever changing demands. The »space of places« is thus absorbed by the »space of flows« (see Castells: *The Rise of the Network Society*; ch. 6). It is, if it happens to be, the end of place through the dominance of space.

Bibliography

Albrow, Martin: *The Global Age – State and Society Beyond Modernity*. Polity Press/Blackwell, Cambridge/Oxford 1996

- Appadurai, Arjun: *Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy*. In: Featherstone, Mike (ed.): *Global Culture*. Pp. 295B310
- Baudrillard, Jean: *Simulacra and Simulation*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 1994 [1981]
- Bauman, Zygmunt: *Globalization – The Human Consequences*. Columbia University Press, New York 1998
- Beck, Ulrich: *Risik Society – Towards a New Modernity*. Sage Publications, London 1992 [1986]
- Bendix, Reinhard/Lipset, Seymour M. (ed.): *Class, Status and Power*. The Free Press, New York 1966
- Bourdieu, Pierre: *Distinction – A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1984 [1979]
- Bourdieu, Pierre: *Site Effects*. In: Ibid. (ed.): *The Weight of the World*. Pp. 123B129
- Bourdieu, Pierre: *The Forms of Capital*. In: Richardson, John G. (ed.): *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. Pp. 241B258
- Bourdieu, Pierre: *Language and Symbolic Power*. Polity Press, Cambridge 1991 [1982]
- Bourdieu, Pierre: *The Logic of Practice*. Polity Press, Cambridge 1990 [1980]
- Bourdieu, Pierre (ed.): *The Weight of the World – Social Suffering in Contemporary Societies*. Polity Press, Cambridge 1999 [1995]
- Bourdieu, Pierre: *Social Space and the Genesis of »Classes«*. In: Ibid: *Language and Symbolic Power*. Pp. 229B251
- Castells, Manuel: *The Rise of the Network Society*. Blackwell, Oxford/Cambridge 1996
- Dahrendorf, Ralf: *Life Chances – Approaches to Social and Political Theory*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1979
- Davis, Kingsley/Moore, Wilbert E.: *Some Principles of Stratification*. In: Bendix, Reinhard/Lipset, Seymour M. (ed.): *Class, Status and Power*. Pp. 47B53
- Eagleton, Terry: *The Illusions of Postmodernism*. Blackwell, Oxford/Cambridge 1996
- Featherstone, Mike: *Postmodernism and the Aesthetization of Everyday Life*. In: Lash, Scott/Friedman, Jonathan (ed.): *Modernity and Identity*. Pp. 265B290
- Featherstone, Mike (ed.): *Global Culture – Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. Sage Publications, London/Newbury Park/New Delhi 1995
- Featherstone, Mike/Lash, Scott/Robertson, Roland (ed.): *Global Modernities*. Sage Publications, London/Newbury Park/New Delhi 1995
- Field, James A.: *Transnationalism and the New Tribe*. In: Keohane, Robert O./Nye, Joseph S. (ed.): *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. Pp. 3B22
- Fukuyama, Francis: *The End of History?* In: *The National Interest*. Vol. 16 (1989), pp. 3B19.

- Giddens, Anthony: *The Class Structure of Advanced Societies*. Hutchison, London 1973
- Giddens, Anthony: *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford university Press, Stanford 1990
- Giddens, Anthony: *The Constitution of Society – Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Polity Press, Cambridge 1984
- Giddens, Anthony: *Modernity and Self-Identity – Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Stanford University Press, Stanford 1991
- Giddens, Anthony: *Time, Space and Regionalisation*. In: Gregory, Derek/Urry, John (ed.): *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*. Pp. 265B295
- Gregory, Derek: *Ideology, Science and Human Geographie*. Hutchison, London 1978
- Gregory, Derek/Urry, John (ed.): *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*. Macmillan, London 1985
- Hardt, Michael/Negri, Antonio: *Empire*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2000
- Harvey, David: *The Condition of Postmodernity – An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Blackwell, Oxford/Cambridge 1989
- Jameson, Fredric: *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Verso, London/New York 1991
- Keith, Michael/Pile, Steve (ed.): *Place and the Politics of Identity*. Routledge, London/New York 1993
- Keohane, Robert O./Nye, Joseph S. (ed.): *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1973
- Lash, Scott/Urry, John: *Economies of Signs and Space*. Sage Publications, London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi 1994
- Lash, Scott/Friedman, Jonathan (ed.): *Modernity and Identity*. Blackwell, Oxford/Cambridge 1992
- Lefebvre, Henri: *The Production of Space*. Blackwell, Oxford/Cambridge 1991 [1974]
- Marx, Karl: *The Capital [Vol. 3: The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole]*. Charles H. Kerr & Co., Chicago 1909 [1894]
- Marx, Karl/Engels, Friedrich: *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. William Reeves, London 1888 [1848]
- Massey, Doreen: *Politics and Space/Time*. In: Keith, Michael/Pile, Steve (ed.): *Place and the Politics of Identity*. S. 141B161
- Parsons, Talcot: *An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification*. In: *The American Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 45 (1940), No. 6, pp. 821B862
- Richardson, John G. (ed.): *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. Greenwood Press, New York 1985

- Robertson, Roland: *Globalization – Social Theory and Global Culture*. Sage Publications, London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi 1992
- Robertson, Roland: *Glocalization – Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity*. In: Featherstone, Mike/Lash, Scott/Robertson, Roland (ed.): *Global Modernities*. Pp. 25B44
- Sassen, Saskia: *The Global City – New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1991
- Sayer, Andrew: *The Difference that Space Makes*. In: Gregory, Derek/Urry, John (ed.): *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*. Pp. 49B66
- Sennett, Richard: *The Corrosion of Character – The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism*. Norton & Company, New York/London 1998
- Sklair, Leslie: *Sociology of the Global System*. Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, London 1995
- Sklair, Leslie: *The Transnational Capitalist Class*. Blackwell, Oxford/Cambridge 2001
- Soja, Edward W.: *Postmodern Geographies – The Reassertion of Space in Critical/Social Theory*. Verso, London/New York 1989
- Taylor, Peter J.: *Beyond Containers – Internationality, Interstateness, Interterritoriality*. In: *Progress in Human Geography*. No. 1/1995, pp. 1B15
- Virilio, Paul: *Speed and Politics – An Essay on Dromology*. Semiotext(e), New York 1986 [1977]
- Wallerstein, Immanuel: *Geopolitics and Geoculture – Essays on the Changing World-System*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991
- Wallerstein, Immanuel: *The Modern World System – Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. Academic Press, New York/London 1974
- Weber, Max: *Economy and Society – An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*. University of California Press, Berkeley 1978 [1922]
- Wright, Erik O.: *Classes*. Verso, London 1985
- Wright, Erik O.: *Class Counts – Comparative Studies in Class Analysis*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996
- Wright, Erik O.: *Varieties of Marxist Conceptions of Class Structure*. In: *Politics and Society*. Vol. 9 (1980), pp. 323B370
- Zablocki, Benjamin/Kanter-Moss, Rosabeth: *The Differentiation of Life-Styles*. In: *Annual Review of Sociology*. Vol. 2 (1976), pp. 269B298
- Zukin, Sharon: *Landscapes of Power – From Detroit to Disney World*. University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford 1991